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a b s t r a c t
The ongoing coronavirus disease 19s pandemic has yet again demonstrated the importance of the
human-animal interface in the emergence of zoonotic diseases, and in particular the role of wildlife
and livestock species as potential hosts and virus reservoirs. As most diseases emerge out of the
human-animal interface, a better understanding of the specific drivers and mechanisms involved is cru-
cial to prepare for future disease outbreaks. Interactions between wildlife and livestock systems con-
tribute to the emergence of zoonotic diseases, especially in the face of globalization, habitat
fragmentation and destruction and climate change. As several groups of viruses and bacteria are more
likely to emerge, we focus on pathogenic viruses of the Bunyavirales, Coronaviridae, Flaviviridae,
Orthomyxoviridae, and Paramyxoviridae, as well as bacterial species including Mycobacterium sp.,
Brucella sp., Bacillus anthracis and Coxiella burnetii. Noteworthy, it was difficult to predict the drivers of
disease emergence in the past, even for well-known pathogens. Thus, an improved surveillance in hotspot
areas and the availability of fast, effective, and adaptable control measures would definitely contribute to
preparedness. We here propose strategies to mitigate the risk of emergence and/or re-emergence of pri-
oritized pathogens to prevent future epidemics.
 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of The Animal Consortium. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Implications
The emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coron-
avirus 2 and the resulting pandemic of coronavirus disease 19
reminds us the importance of a suitable monitoring of human-
animal interfaces to prevent future pandemics we could face. Live-
stock species are in close contact with humans, are often involved
in (re)emergences, and then deserve to be carefully considered
when assessing zoonotic disease emergence. Determining at least
partly the next potential bacterial and viral candidates for zoonotic
emergence and identifying the main drivers can help to outline
new measures to decrease the risk. We discuss here all these
aspects about the main already known potential candidates for
emergence and we propose strategies to mitigate the risk of (re)
emergence and prevent future epidemics.
Introduction
More than 60% of all human infectious diseases, described
between 1940 and 2004, originate from animals (Jones et al.,
2008). A broad variety of animals including species of livestock,
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mals are sources of pathogens. Livestock can be defined as mam-
mals that are kept on a farm such as small and large ruminants
(Bos taurus, Capra aegagrus hircus and Ovis aries) and pigs (Sus
scrofa). Poultry includes chickens (Gallus gallus), ducks and geese
(several species in the Anatidae family). With the largest definition
of the word livestock, less common species like alpaca (Vicugna
pacos), bison (Bison bison), elk (Cervus canadensis), camel and dro-
medary (Camelus sp), guineafowl (Numida meleagris), mink (Neovi-
son vison), and ostrich (Struthio camelus) should also be considered
as sources of pathogens. Livestock and poultry provide many goods
and services to human populations such as milk, meat, eggs, hides,
feathers, fibres and manure, which all pose a risk for human patho-
gen exposure. In this review, nonavian livestock and poultry will be
considered together under the term livestock (FAO definition),
which are farm domestic animals raised for subsistence or local
sales, thereby mingle with other species, or supply international
markets with large numbers following long distance transports.
Wildlife includes a wide range of species that not only are relevant
because of their direct interaction, but also because of their use as
bushmeat for human and animal consumption. Conversely, pet
animals will not be discussed in this review. Amongst the patho-
gens causing emerging infectious diseases, viruses are naturally
very well-represented. This is not surprising, since 76% of viruses
affecting humans are zoonotic while for bacteria a percentage of
50 has been described (Taylor et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2008).
According to the World Organization for Animal health (OIE), an
emerging disease is ‘‘a new infection resulting from the evolution
or change of an existing pathogen or parasite resulting in a change
of host range, vector, pathogenicity or strain; or the occurrence of a
previously unrecognized infection or disease”. A re-emerging dis-
ease is ‘‘an already known disease that either shifts its geographical
setting or expands its host range, or significantly increases its
prevalence”. Interestingly, amongst animals, mammals have been
identified as the main reservoir (around 80%) of human infectious
agents and ungulates, probably because they are also major food
sources, are the mammalian taxon sharing the highest number of
pathogens with humans (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al.,
2001; Woolhouse and Gowtage-Sequeria, 2005; Jones et al.,
2008). Compared to ungulates, birds are second in line although
less prone to transmit infectious diseases to humans. Since ungu-
lates and birds are massively represented amongst livestock spe-
cies, these observations are particularly relevant for the current
review.
Various livestock farming systems are used for domestic mam-
mal and bird species with a huge variety in animal density world-
wide (Derner et al., 2017; Gilbert et al., 2018). The systems can be
intensive or extensive with a maximization of the production in
the first system. With an increased demand for animal products
due to a fast growing human population, intensive livestock sys-
tems developed massively in Western countries, Asia and South
America (Duru and Therond, 2015; FAO, 2020). The intensive farm-
ing system has particularly been applied to pigs, dairy cattle, and
poultry. When ruminant livestock (cattle, sheep, camelids and
goats) are compared to monogastric species such as pigs, turkeys
and chickens, a difference can be identified in terms of production
system (FAO, 2020). Ruminant livestock systems are more depen-
dent on the land and available space while chicken and pig produc-
tion systems depend more on consumer demand and the level of
financial investment (FAO, 2020). In the 1980s, a progressive
awareness about the negative impact of productive systems – asso-
ciated with intensive farming systems – on biodiversity and cli-
mate change, but also on animal production quality, animal
welfare, human health, and depletion of fossil and water resources
emerged in many countries (Duru and Therond, 2015). Alteration2
of the biodiversity and climate change were shown to drive the
(re)emergence of infectious diseases (Zell, 2004; Keesing et al.,
2010). Thus, organic practices promoting traditional methods
without synthetic inputs and pesticides were developed in Wes-
tern countries and were used as alternatives to the conventional
practices. Indeed, conventional practices were accompanied by
mechanization, simplification and standardization of production
modes, a decreased diversity of crops varieties and livestock
breeds, and the creation of uniform landscapes (Derner et al.,
2017). Then, new integrated farming systems emerged (Veysset
et al., 2014; Martin et al., 2016). These systems based on ecological
principles combine organic and conventional practices (Duru and
Therond, 2015).
Regarding disease emergence, different models have been
developed to describe the process through which zoonoses could
emerge (Morse et al., 2012). Morse et al originally described the
process in two steps, the first being the introduction into a new
species – human for instance – and the second being the establish-
ment/dissemination (Morse, 1995). Then, Wolfe and collaborators
developed a five-stage model of pathogen adaptation to humans
(Wolfe et al., 2007). In stage 1, the pathogen is unable to infect
humans while in stage 5 it is causing exclusively a human disease.
In 2012, Morse and collaborators proposed an alternative model
explaining the emergence in three steps (Morse et al., 2012). In
that model, the stage 1 corresponds to the pre-emergence state,
in which microorganisms are being transmitted between their nat-
ural animal reservoirs. Modifications of the surrounding environ-
ment, the ecological niches and others impact the animal
populations and affect the dynamics of transmission, increasing
the risk of pathogen spillover to other wildlife or livestock species
(Daszak et al., 2006). Stage 2 represents the first spillover of the
pathogen from wildlife or livestock to humans. At this stage there
is still no, or limited human-to-human transmission (Ebola virus or
H5N1 influenza virus) (Morse et al., 2012). Stage 3 corresponds to
the full epidemic emergence, with sustained person-to-person
transmission and a large-scale or worldwide spread of the patho-
gen and associated disease. Examples of stage 3 are the emergence
of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) in
2002, pandemic H1N1 influenza virus in 2009, and SARS-CoV-2
in 2019.
Here, we selected pathogens likely to (re)emerge in the future
at the interface of wildlife-, livestock-, and human-systems, based
on the current knowledge, and discussed drivers of emergence and
strategies to mitigate associated risks. We particularly developed
the chapters dealing with viruses and to some extent bacteria
and deliberately excluded fungi, parasites and prions. Indeed,
viruses and bacteria are more likely to cause significant epidemics
even if some exceptions exist such as malaria, a parasitic disease
most probably of zoonotic origin.Drivers of Emergence and Hotspots
Many factors can be involved in the emergence of zoonotic dis-
eases (Walsh et al., 2020). Increasing populations of humans and
animal species are often associated with a rise in the circulation
of infectious disease agents and therefore are obvious factors in
the risk of emerging zoonotic threats. The interactions between
pathogens and their hosts – including the reservoir considered as
a multi-host system – are closely associated with the environment
they are in, and these are changing at an increasing pace. It must be
underlined that the (re)emergence of zoonoses is always a multi-
factorial process. This process can involve, amongst others, modifi-
cations in farming and trading practices, human behaviour, animal
vector distribution and in the genetics of the microorganisms and
their hosts. Furthermore, the different drivers can play various and
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2010; Wang and Crameri, 2014).
It is also of high importance to evaluate and understand the
impacts of these changes on the interactions between the patho-
genic microorganisms and their hosts and between the host and
other animal species, including livestock, wildlife and humans.
These interactions are at the core of zoonoses (re)emergence,
understanding these drivers and impacts will allow the develop-
ment of mitigation strategies and enable an effective and timely
response. Typically, when the first infected human (index case)
transmits the infectious agent to more than one other human, an
infection can cause an epidemic in a human population. Immuno-
logical studies investigating quantitative and qualitative differ-
ences in the host-virus equilibrium in animal reservoirs can help
us to elucidate why some viruses are more hazardous than others.
On a more local level, elevated transmission risk is found at food
places with a high human to animal contact frequency, such as
wet markets and slaughterhouses, which are essential for the daily
food supply for billions of consumers.
In many regions of the world, we see changing farming prac-
tices or changing farm management. This includes the moderniza-
tion of farming, particularly in the developing world, and the
intensification of farming ongoing in the Western world for more
cost-effective production. Besides intensification of farming prac-
tices also habitat clearance for cropping and grazing can result in
alteration of biodiversity and promote (re)emergence of infectious
diseases (Keesing et al., 2010). These agricultural drivers are signif-
icant and have a number of effects, including mixing diverse wild-
life species together and pushing wildlife and livestock into
overlapping environments, thus facilitating the transfer of novel
agents into naive and susceptible species (Greger, 2007).
Global air travel easily leads to a rapid and intercontinental
spread of a pathogen, for example in the case of SARS-CoV in
2003 and recently very clearly seen for SARS-CoV-2. Reservoir
hosts and vectors can spread pathogens more rapidly due to inter-
national movement or through trade (Morse et al., 2012). Intensi-
fied encroachment into areas of virus endemicity increases the
number of diseases attributable to vector-borne pathogens and it
may also increase the number of infections coming from wildlife.
Bushmeat consumption is still a significant traditional practice
and a growing food source in many countries. When the live ani-
mals are moved to markets where diverse species are in close con-
tact, more trade in bushmeat can definitely increase the risk of
pathogen transmission (Greatorex et al., 2016). It is known that
the initial transmission of the SARS-CoV, from a chiroptera reser-
voir to the amplifying hosts (including masked palm civet, Paguma
larvata), was a consequence of this type of farming and trading
activities. Also, in 2019, a wildlife market may have facilitated
SARS-CoV-2 transmission from the animal reservoir to the human
population (Li et al., 2020a; Andersen et al., 2020).
Climate change and weather changes affect vector, reservoir
and pathogen life cycles since these are influenced by multiple
and complex processes in their environment (Zinsstag et al.,
2018). Modifications of the climate and the habitat can have signif-
icant impact on the insect vector distribution. For instance, a
pathogen previously limited to a specific area can move to another
area where naive populations of animals and humans are present.
Heavy rainfalls or extended drought periods can occur due to cli-
mate change, and may increase the dispersion of mosquitoes. In
more urban areas, water storage facilities and swimming pools as
well as the trade of used tires can increase the dispersion of mos-
quitoes. Zoonotic viruses such as West Nile virus (WNV) and Rift
Valley fever virus (RVFV) show an increased distribution in many
countries with the colonization of new habitats by their associated
vectors. In the north, climate change can also increase the release3
of some pathogens from frozen soils, see Bacillus anthracis in bacte-
ria section.
Different animal species, especially rodents and bats, can carry a
multitude of pathogens with public and veterinary health implica-
tions. Several species have the potential to rapidly reach high pop-
ulation numbers, which may create unpredictable situations of
high pathogen transmission risks. Rodent populations are heavily
affected by environmental changes, including urbanization and cli-
mate change.
Wildlife can be considered as the main reservoir for many
emerging zoonotic diseases (for an interesting review see (Yon
et al., 2019)), and often also the dispersing factor. For one group
of pathogens, the actual transmission of the pathogen is rare and
human-to-human transmission maintains the circulation of the
pathogen in the population, whereas for other pathogens, direct
or vector-mediated transmission is the usual source of human
infection. While viruses can jump from wild to domesticated ani-
mals without any human intervention, trade and animal transports
also play a role in the spread of wildlife zoonoses (Bengis et al.,
2004). Regions or activities where humans frequently interact with
wildlife (hunting-bushmeat, wet markets, deforestation areas, bird
migration routes) are the risk hotspots for animal-to-human trans-
mission of zoonotic agents. Transmission risk between wildlife,
livestock and humans is further increased by the massive loss of
wildlife habitat and changes in land use. Today, more than 77%
of the land (without Antarctica) and 87% of the ocean has been
altered by the direct effects of human activities (Allan et al.,
2017; Watson et al., 2018). Alterations of the last high biodiversity
areas in Africa, Asia, Central and South America can significantly
increase interactions between livestock and wildlife species and
promote (re)emergence events.
Besides wildlife, pets, and livestock, urban fauna can act as
reservoirs of zoonotic diseases. It is estimated that over 60% of
western families own a pet. Many urban areas are experiencing
an increase in the population of stray and semi-domestic dogs.
Livestock is one of the fastest-growing agricultural subsectors in
developing countries, driven by the rapidly increasing demand
for livestock products due to population growth, urbanization
and improved incomes (FAO, 2020).
Risk Assessment of Emergence
Risk assessment aims at integrating available knowledge to
evaluate the probability and consequences of an emergence in
a population. Determining the scale and localization of the pop-
ulation of interest for a given risk assessment is pivotal. Indeed,
the occurrence and impact of an emergence can vary from local
to global. Moreover, the interactions between wildlife and
domestic animals vary largely from a region of the world to
the other, as well as contacts between animal and human popu-
lations. For instance, in Europe, a lot of effort has been put into
limiting the interactions between wildlife and livestock over the
past 60 years, in order to avoid emergence of diseases in farm
animals and to increase production performance. New trends
in farm management, however, tend to provide more outdoor
access and thus the potential for increased disease transmission.
Risk assessment helps to estimate whether the conditions are
present in countries or regions, so that steps can be taken to
minimize transmission between animals but also to humans.
Health authorities can utilize such risk assessments strategies
to mitigate the risk.
Risk assessment follows a methodology recognized and shared
by different authors and institutions. It consists of estimating the
probability of the different events that contribute to the emergence
of a hazard: first, the probability of hazard emission by the source,
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this hazard. The risk assessment then consists of taking these prob-
abilities into account, while estimating the consequences of emer-
gence. The probabilities of emission and exposure are mainly a
combination of several conditional probabilities, which are related
to the different stages allowing the emergence to occur. In order to
identify these stages, the use of an event diagram is recommended.
It describes the risks pathways, which are the series of events
required to occur so that the hazard under consideration results
in the unwanted outcome specified (Saegerman et al., 2018). At
the interface of wildlife and livestock systems, the issues for the
risk assessment are (i) the wildlife surveillance, especially the
determination of the health status of wild animals for the hazards
under consideration and (ii) the extent of direct or indirect con-
tacts between farm animals and wildlife. If risk assessment is pos-
sible at the interface, it helps health authorities to have a better
idea of this risk and adopt management options proportionate to
the risk. Depending on the hazard, many different pathways have
been identified for zoonotic diseases at the wildlife-livestock inter-
face, resulting in exposure of human populations (Fig. 1). In a few
cases, human exposure is directly related to sources in the wildlife,
but most often livestock play an important role either because
close contact with farm animals is more likely to occur than with
wild animals, or because livestock in turn can amplify the patho-
gen reservoir. Transmission between the two animal compart-
ments can be occasional spillover, or repeated in time. Finally,
the probability of an emergence in humans is largely increased
when inter-human transmission of the pathogen occurs. Risk
assessment methods can be qualitative (Panel EFSA AHAW, 2006;
Jori et al., 2009; Dufour et al., 2011) or use quantitative, determin-
istic or stochastic models (Jori and Etter, 2016), depending on
available data.
When focusing on the risk assessment at the wildlife-livestock
interface, a main issue is data availability and access, in order to
estimate the different stage probabilities in the event diagram.
Unlike a disease specific to farm animals, for which a number of
data are often available, specific difficulties result from under-
standing and precise description of the wildlife compartment. First,
species present and animal densities have to be known. Then, esti-
mating the hazard emission probability by wildlife requires a good
knowledge of the pathogens in the wildlife and the environment.
Moreover, the diagnosis of an infection can be very complex in
wildlife (challenging capture, frequent coinfections and lack of
adapted tools amongst others) compromising further actions.
When the presence of pathogens is known, surveillance of wildlife
remains difficult and quantitative data stay scarce. Prevalence sur-
veys (Varela-Castro et al., 2017) and long-term and risk-based
wildlife health surveillance are decisive. Monitoring of the health
situation cannot go without a good knowledge of the ecology of
wild species and the modelling of their population dynamics,
which directly influence the development of an outbreak in this
compartment. Next, estimating livestock exposure probability, for
the hazard under consideration, requires a good view of the inter-
actions between wildlife and livestock in the studied area. Live-
stock exposure probability depends on contacts between wildlife
and livestock. Specific studies to characterize the wildlife-
livestock interface use different methods such as questionnaires
to stakeholders (Meunier et al., 2017), telemetric monitoring of
wildlife (Triguero-Ocaña et al., 2020), or rely on data analysis by
modelling (Barasona et al., 2014) or risk factor identification
(Sichewo et al., 2020). A systematic review has highlighted the
wide variation and lack of consensus in the definitions of direct
and indirect contacts between wild and farm animals (Bacigalupo
et al., 2020). The authors proposed a generic unified framework
for defining contacts, sufficiently flexible to be applied to most
wildlife and livestock species, and adapted to each specific patho-4
gen (for non-vector-borne diseases). This can support future data
collection to describe precisely these interactions. In the case of a
vector born pathogen, an additional step is needed to evaluate
the vector population dynamics.
Finally, after having completed a risk assessment, the potential
measures for control and their expected result can be evaluated.
Indeed, the respective roles of wildlife, livestock and their interac-
tions in emission, amplification of the pathogen sources and expo-
sure of humans can be identified and weighed. Targeting risk
mitigation for the main mechanisms which enable emergence
depends widely on the pathogen as each pathosystem is specific
(Fig. 1). For a given pathogen, the interactions which result in
human exposure can vary in time or between regions, as was evi-
denced for influenza viruses, for rabies virus or for the Nipah virus.
Therefore, risk assessment has to be adapted to each region, and
regularly updated. Moreover, multidisciplinary collaboration is
necessary, implying wildlife specialists, as well as veterinary and
medical professionals. An even wider approach including environ-
mental disciplines also may be indicated, demonstrating the need
for a One Health approach elaborated below. Capacity building to
perform risk assessment for disease emergence at the interface
between wildlife, livestock and humans and to mitigate risk has
been promoted by international agencies (World Health
Organization, 2019).Prevention and control of emergence
Old wisdom of infectious disease prevention and control
Successful infection needs the establishment of an infection
chain, which includes infectious agent, transmission and host, with
the interactions between an infectious agent, routes of transmis-
sion, and host factors determining the spectrum of signs and symp-
toms (Detels et al., 2015). Correspondingly, the measures and tools
to interrupt the infection chain are effective and applicable for pre-
vention and control of infectious diseases, including (re)emerging
zoonoses. These measures and tools encompass the elimination
or restriction of infectious agents, interference with the transmis-
sion routes, and identification and protection of susceptible hosts
using various approaches including vaccination. Specifically, the
infectious agents identified in hosts can be restricted or eliminated
by isolation of the infected hosts and by chemical therapy; under
certain cases, the agents will be eliminated by culling and safe dis-
posal of the infected animals, whereas those identified in the envi-
ronment are eliminated by physical or chemical disinfection and
sterilization methods. The transmission routes for infectious dis-
eases can be interfered, interrupted or blocked via improved and
better hygiene and sanitation systems. For vector-borne patho-
gens, the vectors are controlled by chemical, environmental and
biological ways. The susceptible hosts can be protected from
pathogens by quarantine, immunization, human behaviour
changes and other intervention measures. Among the various mea-
sures and tools, the surveillance is the most important for recogni-
tion, evaluation and control of infectious diseases (Detels et al.,
2015).One Health approach applied to prevention and control of zoonotic
diseases
Zoonoses involve the mutual interactions of pathogens,
humans, animals, and environment; further, some zoonotic agents
like highly pathogenic A influenza virus, SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-
2 were able to spread globally and cause pandemics. Therefore, a
multi-sectoral approach with interdisciplinary, collaborative strat-
egy is required for the effective control measures and optimal
Fig. 1. Diversity of the interfaces between wildlife and livestock resulting in human exposure to zoonotic pathogens. Solid and dotted arrows represent the main and
secondary mechanisms for amplification and transmission in populations. V: vectors. For some pathogens, transmission pathways involve the environment (e.g. in the case of
anthrax, the interface is the soil contaminated by dead animals). SARS-CoV: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus; MERS-CoV: Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
coronavirus; CCHFV: Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus; JEV: Japanese encephalitis virus; TBEV: tick-borne encephalitis virus; RVFV: Rift Valley fever virus.
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Health concept or One Health approach (Rahman et al., 2020). One
Health was defined by different organizations with similarity: The
American Veterinary Association sets One Health as ‘‘an integrative
effort of multiple disciplines working locally, nationally and glob-
ally to attain optimal health for people, animals and the environ-
ment” (AVMA – One Health Initiative Task Force, 2008). The Food
and Agricultural Organization gives the definition as ‘‘a collabora-
tive, international, multidisciplinary mechanism to address threats
and reduce risks of detrimental infectious diseases at the human–
animal–ecosystem interface” (FAO, 2012), whereas the One Health
Initiative defines One Health as ‘‘a worldwide strategy for expand-5
ing interdisciplinary collaborations and communications in all
aspects of health care for humans, animals and the environment”
(One Health Initiative, 2012). During the last decade, the concept
of One Health has become the international standard for zoonotic
disease control (van Herten et al., 2019). However, the concept is
still ambiguous and functions as a ‘‘boundary object” to leave room
for interpretation and facilitate cooperation, so that the equal
health of humans, animals and the environment can be possibly
improved (van Herten et al., 2019). Certainly, the implementation
of One Health concept depends on multiple organizations and var-
ious governments to promote and coordinate the cooperation, and
fund inter-sectoral activities. Thanks to the efforts of multiple
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tional, with an array of One Health tools available, among which
twelve commonly implemented One Health tools are used for dif-
ferent countries in strengthening One Health systems (Pelican
et al., 2019). Animals as the key component of the One Health con-
cept play a vital role in security, economic and social well-being of
humanity. Targeting the ‘risk at source’ in animal populations is a
vital strategy in reducing the risks of emerging zoonoses. As such,
by collaborating mostly with public health, food safety, and envi-
ronmental authorities, veterinary authority should follow the per-
formance of veterinary services pathway, which was proposed by
the OIE under the One Health concept to prevent and control zoo-
noses (Stratton et al., 2019).
Prevention and control of zoonotic diseases at the interface of livestock
systems
Livestock has a major economic role in the development of
many countries. Because of increased interactions (outdoor access
and high animal densities for instance), livestock are important
source of zoonotic microorganisms and frequently involved in their
spread to humans. External as well as internal measures of biose-
curity, adapted to the different pathogens, are absolutely needed
to limit the risks of transmission to humans. Different measures
are available including, amongst others, the cleaning and steriliza-
tion of the environment, the culling of infected animals, animal
vaccination, and restriction of animal and people movements
(Layton et al., 2017). Culling of infected animals is a very effective
measure. However, mass culling is expensive because of the loss of
animals and the costs associated with waste management. In addi-
tion, a major ethical issue exists for culling healthy livestock ani-
mals. Preventive immunization of livestock is a very cost-
effective measure if the vaccine is available. For instance, regarding
human brucellosis for which there is no effective vaccine, the pre-
vention is based on the education of the persons in contact with
animals and on the disease control in animal populations. Eradica-
tion of brucellosis in ruminants could be achieved based on a com-
bination of slaughter of seropositive adult animals and the
vaccination of young animals (Ganter, 2015). Vaccinating livestock
against vectors in combination with biological control of the vec-
tors such as mosquito and tick which transmit certain pathogens
(this strategy already existed for tick) represented promising pre-
ventive measures (Díaz-Martín et al., 2015).
The great incidence of zoonotic diseases in livestock are related
to a number of factors including animal production system,
increases in global travel, trade and urbanization, human beha-
viour, vector habitat change, wildlife reservoir, climate change
etc. The pathogen needs to overcome several barriers to success-
fully reach livestock and humans. In addition to conventional pre-
ventive approaches such as the vaccination of wildlife species,
treatments, disinfection and chemical control, ecological interven-
tions in a One Health approach can be proposed (Sokolow et al.,
2019). These interventions allow, amongst others, to control the
density, distribution and infectiousness of the wildlife hosts as well
as the survival and spread of the zoonotic agent in the environment
and the risks of contacts with the spillover host. It has been recom-
mended, for instance, not to plant fruit trees that attract bats, too
close to pig pens in the context of Nipah virus control. Similarly,
to reduce transmission from bats to horses of Hendra virus, it
has been suggested to block the horse overnight access to trees
in pastures. Ecological interventions need considerations of the
economic, social and political factors to achieve success in manag-
ing spillover from wildlife. Globally, synergistic ecological inter-
ventions between countries such as China and US are essential
for control of global emerging zoonosis spread from wildlife reser-
voirs (Smiley Evans et al., 2020).6
Actually, all zoonotic pathogens from wildlife or other verte-
brate reservoir must overcome a hierarchical series of barriers to
cause spillover in humans, therefore, understanding how these
barriers are intrinsically linked, and how they interact in space
and time, will substantially improve our ability to predict or pre-
vent spillover events (Plowright et al., 2017). In this regard, the
coronavirus disease 19s (COVID-19) pandemic has its wildlife ori-
gin and understanding its spillover mechanism from wildlife will
teach us lots of lessons (Morens and Fauci, 2020).Candidates for the next zoonotic emergence
In this section, diverse and distinguishing examples of candi-
dates for (re)emergence amongst viruses and bacteria are pre-
sented (see Table 1 for the main zoonotic agents and role of the
different wild and livestock species and Table 2 for examples of
viral orders that could lead to the next zoonotic emergences).Viruses
Members of the Bunyavirales order
Recently, the World Health Organization (WHO) has acknowl-
edged the threats posed by several viruses belonging to Bunyavi-
rales order in the face of insufficient or absent countermeasures
(Bernasconi et al., 2020). Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
(CCHFV) is endemic to Southern Europe, Africa, the Middle-East,
Southern Asia, and Western China, making it the most widely dis-
tributed tick-borne virus affecting humans. The virus is maintained
in a transmission cycle involving ixodid (hard) ticks and a variety
of wild- and domesticated animals. The tick species most associ-
ated with CCHFV transmission is the two-host tick Hyalomma
marginatum which is known as a ‘‘hunting tick” (Gargili et al.,
2017). CCHFV can be transmitted by all developmental stages of
H. marginatum with larvae and nymphs feeding on small animals
such as hedgehogs, hares, and ground feeding birds, and adults tar-
geting larger animals such as sheep, cattle, and humans. CCHFV
infection of animals remains unapparent, while human infections
may result in a severe, life-threatening disease. Symptomatic infec-
tions of humans initiate with sudden onset of flu-like symptoms.
Patients progressing to the haemorrhagic syndrome develop a
petechial rash, followed by haemorrhage of the conjunctiva and
other mucus membranes that may exacerbate with development
of large cutaneous ecchymoses, haematuria and bleeding from
the gastrointestinal tract. Fatal cases are associated with multi-
organ failure and shock. Whereas some small outbreaks have sug-
gested much higher numbers, the average case-fatality rate of
CCHF is estimated at 5% (Bente et al., 2013). Most humans affected
are farmers, veterinarians, and abattoir workers. Infections of
farmers and veterinarians are generally attributed to tick bites,
whereas infections of abattoir workers are believed to result from
exposure to contaminated blood. Social and cultural practices, such
as the ritual slaughtering of ruminants during the Hajj and Eid-al-
Adha, are epidemiologically linked to CCHF outbreaks (Sorvillo
et al., 2020).
Another example of a tick-borne virus that circulates at the
human-livestock-wildlife interface is Huaiyangshan banyangvirus
(BHAV), formally known as Severe Fever with Thrombocytopenia
Syndrome virus (SFTSV) (Maslow et al., 2019). The primary vector
of BHAV is the Asian longhorned tick, Haemaphysalis longicornis,
which transmits the virus to sheep, goats, cattle, pigs, dogs, chick-
ens, and humans. Regarding cattle, a particular role in the trans-
mission to humans, directly or indirectly, has been suggested
(Xing et al., 2017). Animal infection is generally asymptomatic,
whereas humans may present with thrombocytopenia, leukopenia,
and multi-organ failure (Liu et al., 2014). After its first detection in
Table 1
Main zoonotic agents and role of the different wild and livestock species.
















Reservoir Poultry / Spillover host Y = avian
influenza


















Cattle, camels, pigs, donkeys, horses,
swine




Rift valley fever virus Wild ruminants and
camels are susceptible to






Giraffe, kudu, warthogs, buffalo, gazelle,
springbuck, waterbuck, antelope,
wildebeest, impala, rhinoceros, alpaca,
dog, cat, bat
Amplifying host, transmission via
mosquitoes to animals and humans, and
transmission to humans during slaughtering
of infected animals









Humans Giraffe, camelids, rhinoceros, buffalo,
kudu, horse, donkey, ostrich, dog
Amplifying hosts, transmission via ticks to
animals and humans and nosocomial
transmission to humans




Sheep, goat, cattle Humans Dog, pig, chicken Amplifying hosts, transmission via ticks to
animals and humans and nosocomial
transmission to humans
N N Mild to severe complications
including multiple organ failure,
thrombocytopenia, leucopenia
Mycobacterium bovis Part of a multihost
reservoir (badger, wild
boar, red deer. . .)





Brucella melitensis Secondary reservoir (ibex) Small
ruminants,
cattle
Pigs, horses Reservoir Y = ruminant
brucellosis
Y Brucellosis





Coxiella burnetii Reservoir (multihost) Ruminants / Part of the multihost reservoir Y = Q fever N Q fever




Swine, horses Contamination of the soil and of humans by
dead animals
Y = anthrax Y Anthrax















Examples of viral orders that could lead to the next zoonotic emergences.
Orders Selected families Examples of previous/current emergences
Bunyavirales
(enveloped segmented negative-strand RNA viruses)
Nairoviridae
Phenuiviridae
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV)
Huaiyayangshan banyangvirus (BHAV)
Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV)
Nidovirales
(enveloped positive-strand RNA viruses)
Coronaviridae Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
Arteriviridae /
Amarillovirales
(enveloped positive-strand RNA viruses)






West Nile virus (WNV)
Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV)
Usutu virus (USUV)
Articulavirales
(enveloped segmented negative-strand RNA viruses)
Orthomyxoviridae Pandemic type A influenzaviruses
Mononegavirales
(enveloped negative-strand RNA viruses)





Chitovirales (enveloped DNA) Poxviridae Not clear
Herpesvirales (enveloped double-stranded DNA). . . Herpesviridae Unlikely
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et al., 2011), the virus was detected in Korea (Kim et al., 2018)
and Japan (Takahashi et al., 2014). The average case-fatality ratios
reported by these countries vary from 5 to 16% in China to 23% in
Korea and 27% in Japan (Yun et al., 2020).
Interestingly, a virus related to BHAV, named Heartland virus
(HTLV), was detected in 2009, in Missouri (US), in farmers present-
ing with low white-blood-cell and platelet counts (McMullan et al.,
2012). HTLV is believed to be transmitted by the ‘‘lone star” tick,
Amblyomma americanum, and serological testing has suggested
that raccoons and white-tailed deer may function as amplifying
hosts (Brault et al., 2018). Although outbreaks caused by tick-
borne Phenuiviridae are currently sporadic, the recent (re)emer-
gence of these viruses calls for further assessment of their potential
future impact on human health.
The member of the Bunyavirales order with clearly the most sig-
nificant impact on both animal and human health is Rift valley
fever virus (RVFV), a phlebovirus that is transmitted by mosqui-
toes (Lumley et al., 2017). Wild- and domesticated ruminants,
camelids and humans are susceptible to disease, primarily result-
ing from hepatic necrosis following extensive replication of the
virus in the liver. RVFV is endemic to Africa and the Arabian Penin-
sula, where large outbreaks occur after interepidemic periods that
may last for decades. Globalization, climate change, and the world-
wide distribution of potential mosquito vectors explain the risk of
future incursions into currently unaffected areas (Wright et al.,
2019). Sheep are the most susceptible to RVFV, with susceptibility
being highest at young age. New-born lambs generally succumb to
the infection as a consequence of extensive liver necrosis, whereas
mortality rates among adult sheep may also be substantial. A char-
acteristic feature of RVFV outbreaks are abortion storms, in which
all pregnant ewes in a flock may abort their foetuses. Goats, cattle
and camelids are less susceptible than sheep, although significant
morbidity, new-born fatalities and abortions also occur in these
species. Humans may become infected through mosquito bites,
although most human cases are attributed to contact with contam-
inated animal tissues during slaughter. Most human cases present
with a self-resolving flu-like syndrome without serious conse-
quences, whereas a substantial number of patients develop tempo-
ral or permanent vision loss resulting from retinal lesions. A small8
percentage of patients (1–2%) develop neurological disorders or
haemorrhagic icterus (Ikegami and Makino, 2011).
Human exposure to these arthropod-borne viruses can be
prevented by avoiding mosquito and tick bites and nosocomial
infections can be prevented by proper sanitary practices. The
increasing acknowledgement of human health risks posed by Bun-
yavirales order members has stimulated novel initiatives to develop
vaccines, antibodies and antiviral therapies, as well as novel animal
models (Garrison et al., 2019; Maslow et al., 2019). Importantly, the
coalition for epidemic preparedness innovations is currently sup-
porting the development of Rift valley fever vaccines (Gouglas
et al., 2019; Petrova et al., 2020), providing newhope for the preven-
tion and control of future epidemics. The availability of stockpiled
vaccines for immediate employment in the case of an emergence
is of major importance in the prevention and control of an outbreak.
Coronaviridae
At the time of COVID-190s pandemic, the emergence capacity of
coronaviruses was already well-known. The SARS-CoV-2 is the
third emerging coronavirus causing a health crisis in humans dur-
ing the 21st century. The first emerging zoonotic coronavirus was
SARS-CoV in 2003 in China (Guan et al., 2003). This virus, which
uses horseshoe bats (Rhinolophus sp.) as reservoir (Li et al., 2005),
crossed the species barrier to humans by infecting a small mam-
mal, the palm civet (Paguma larvata) (Tu et al., 2004). The civet
being a delicacy in China is bred in farms and sold on markets.
The handling of infected animals or contaminated animal products
on farms and markets may have facilitated passage of the virus to
humans. This first major outbreak due to a zoonotic coronavirus
spread to more than 30 countries on several continents, but the
number of deaths remained relatively low (774) and no further
cases were reported since 2004 (WHO, 2004). A second coron-
avirus that emerged in this century is the Middle East Respiratory
Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). MERS-CoV was for the first
detected in a human case in 2012 and has thus far caused over 2
500 cases with a fatality ratio of 35%. Whereas MERS-CoV is
believed to find its origin in bats, transmission to humans predom-
inantly occurs through infected dromedary camels. The exact role
of dromedaries and camels in the epidemiological cycle of MERS-
CoV is getting better and better understood and a recent review
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virus (Bleibtreu et al., 2020). The study of dromedary camel serum
collections, including sera collected before 1983, showed that a
camel virus closely related to MERS-CoV was already widespread
(>80% seropositivity rate) in the East African countries many years
ago (Müller et al., 2014). This epidemic has remained more geo-
graphically circumscribed but cases are still reported every year
(WHO, 2019). In 2019, SARS-CoV-2 emerged, possibly finding its
origin in Rhinolophidae as suggested by the RaTG13-CoV virus iso-
lated from these bats and having approximately 96% homology
with SARS-CoV-2 (Zhou et al., 2020). By analogy with SARS-CoV
and MERS-CoV, an intermediate host is being suspected but cur-
rently its clear identification remains unsuccessful.
Human coronaviruses may have emerged from animals earlier.
For instance, the coronavirus OC43 that causes mild colds in
humans may have emerged from bovine coronavirus, which is clo-
sely related and is responsible for diarrhoea in cattle. This zoonotic
emergence could have caused what has been described by authors
(Vijgen et al., 2005) as a human epidemic ascribed to influenza
spreading around the world in 1889–1890. The other human coro-
naviruses, i.e. NL63, HKU1 and 229E, all responsible for colds in
humans, are suspected to have emerged from wildlife (bats or
rodents) via intermediate domesticated animals (cattle, dromed-
ary, alpaca) (Corman et al., 2018).
Coronaviruses share with other RNA viruses several mecha-
nisms that may help them to cross the species barriers. Amongst
these mechanisms there is, for instance, the absence of corrective
activity of the viral RNA dependent RNA polymerase enabling a
high mutation rate in RNA viruses. However, some factors more
specifically related to coronaviruses explain these numerous suc-
cessful emergences. Among RNA viruses infecting humans, coron-
aviruses are those with the longest genome (about 30 kb). This
length enables them to withstand large deletions and deleterious
mutations during replication and their ability for inter- and
intra-specific recombinations allows their variability and plasticity
(Woo et al., 2009). Thus, within an infected host, the viral popula-
tion is characterized by many variants, making spillover infection
and adaptation to a new host more likely. In addition, the ability
of coronaviruses to infect numerous animal species favours spil-
lover events and stimulates emergence of novel variants resulting
from exchange of genetic material between related viruses.
Among emerging coronaviruses in humans, the present or
ancestral reservoir of many of them (SARS-CoV, SARS-CoV-2,
MERS-CoV, NL63 and 229E) is bats and for the others (OC43 and
HKU1), the supposed reservoir is rodents. It is unclear whether
bat-borne viruses are more likely to emerge than viruses associ-
ated with other species and/or whether it is the high number of
bat species that makes them more often the reservoir of emerging
pathogens (Luis et al., 2013). Indeed, bats are, with rodents, the
mammals with the largest number of species distributed in many
environments around the world (Burgin et al., 2018).Flaviviridae
Viruses of the genus Flavivirus are among the most important
representatives of zoonotic arboviruses due to their worldwide dis-
tribution and significant number of human infections, amounting
to 400 million cases per year (Holbrook, 2017). Their emergence
is particularly influenced by anthropogenic environmental changes
such as land use and climate change which are strongly impacting
ecotones favouring changes in the virus’ ecology (Despommier
et al., 2006). Zoonotic flaviviruses include tick-borne flaviviruses,
with tick-borne encephalitis virus (TBEV) as the most important
representative, and the large family of mosquito-borne flaviviruses
(MBF). In this review, we describe a selection of MBFs that is far
from being comprehensive with the aim to highlight important9
candidates for emergence and to point to the extraordinary versa-
tility in host tropism and ecology of some flaviviruses.
The yellow fever complex comprises at least nine viruses, of
which six have been found to cause disease in humans. Yellow
fever virus (YFV) is endemic to tropical Africa and South America
(Monath and Vasconcelos, 2015). It is transmitted by Aedes spp.
in Africa and Haemagogus spp. in South America. An important
virus threatening ruminants is Wesselsbron virus (WESSV) which
was first isolated in 1955 in South Africa from a lamb (Weiss
et al., 1956). There have been numerous reports of infections of
other ruminants (Mushi et al., 1998), and ostriches have been also
shown to be infected (Allwright et al., 1995). Importantly, virus
isolation from a black rat in Senegal indicated spread in Africa
(Diagne et al., 2017). WESSV has been reported in over 30 human
cases causing fever, headache, muscle and joint pain. Interestingly,
serological surveys estimated seropositivity at the level of 20–35%
in the countries of Southern Africa (Weyer et al., 2013).
The Spondweni virus complex consists of Zika virus (ZIKV) and
Spondweni virus (SPOV), both transmitted by Aedes mosquitoes
(Haddow and Woodall, 2016). ZIKV was responsible for a recent
epidemic that was associated with high occurrence of micro-
cephaly in infants born of infected mothers (Mlakar et al., 2016).
The evidence of ZIKV to circulate in nonhuman primates, as
described for YFV, appears to be limited (Moreira-Soto and de
Carneiro, 2018). Serological studies in Kenya demonstrated preva-
lence of ZIKV and closely related SPOV in cattle, goats and sheep,
notably closer to irrigated areas (Johnson et al., 1977). Recent
report from China using the plaque reduction neutralization test
showed anti-ZIKV antibody prevalence in sheep at 6.67%
(n = 30/2) (Li et al., 2019). SPOV is widely distributed in Africa
causing febrile illness in humans (Wolfe et al., 1982).
The Kokobera virus (KOKV) complex consists of two viruses:
KOKV and Stratford virus (Simmonds et al., 2017). KOKV, which
was first isolated in 1960 in Queensland (Doherty et al., 1964), is
enzootic to Australia and Papua New Guinea and appears to be
transmitted by Culex and Aedes mosquitoes (Doherty et al., 1964,
1979). Disease symptoms in humans are fever, arthralgia and
lethargy (Mein et al., 1998). Interestingly, serological studies have
shown the presence of antibodies against KOKV in macropods, cat-
tle (Doherty et al., 1964, 1971) and horses (Prow et al., 2013).
The Ntaya virus complex consists of five virus species. Amongst
them, Bagaza virus (BAGV) (Fernández-Pinero et al., 2014) is trans-
mitted by Culex spp., but vector competence has also been demon-
strated experimentally in Aedes aegypti (Sudeep et al., 2013). Its
geographic distribution was long thought to be limited to Africa.
However, BAGV was associated with an outbreak of encephalitis
in humans in 1996 in India, at least based on serological findings
(Bondre et al., 2009). This flavivirus is strongly associated with
birds. Outbreaks were reported in 2010 in Spain affecting several
birds including red-legged partridges, ring-necked pheasants
(Agüero et al., 2011), and common wood pigeons in which
increased mortality was observed (Gamino et al., 2012). Over-
wintering of this virus in Spain and the possibility of direct trans-
mission make BAGV a serious threat to the European bird popula-
tion (Llorente et al., 2013). Ilheus virus (ILHV) has been isolated
from Aedes spp., and Psorophora mosquitoes in 1944 near Ilheus,
Brazil (Laemmert and Hughes, 1947), and geographic distribution
has remained confined to South America. It has been isolated from
several species of wild birds (Catenacci et al., 2018) but serological
studies indicated possible transmission to several mammals
including primates, sloths, horses (Iversson et al., 1993) and
humans, associated with febrile disease (Venegas et al., 2012).
The Japanese encephalitis virus complex consists of eight virus
species, all typically but not only transmitted by Culex ssp., and
often infecting bird species. West Nile virus (WNV) is widespread
in Africa, Asia, Europe, Australia, and the Americas (Hubálek
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(van der Meulen et al., 2005). It also infects a wide range of wild
and domestic mammals and amphibians (Klenk et al., 2004;
Jeffrey, 2013). In the human population, since its emergence in
the USA in 1999, the virus has resulted in over 51 000 reported
cases, over 25 000 reported neuroinvasive cases, almost 2 400
deaths (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). In
horses, over 27 000 cases were reported in the USA since 1999
(Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, US Department of
Agriculture, 2020). Both humans and horses are dead-end hosts
unable to transmit the pathogen back to mosquitoes and infection
can result in subclinical or mild disease or severe encephalitis and
deaths (Colpitts et al., 2012).
Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) is considered one of the major
threats for zoonotic emergence in Europe, Africa and the Americas
where it would hit a naïve vertebrate population. This is because
JEV has so far only established endemicity in Southern Asia
(Rosen, 1986). Despite this, JEV represents the most common cause
of severe viral encephalitis in the human population (Turtle and
Solomon, 2018). Birds, especially wading birds like herons and
egrets, are described as most important vertebrate hosts, with pigs
acting as virus amplifiers in the environment. In pigs, the virus
causes severe reproductive losses through infertility, abortions,
mummification of foetuses, and encephalitis in piglets (Mansfield
et al., 2017). The observation of mosquito-free direct transmission
of JEV between pigs is of concern for areas with intensive pig farm-
ing (Ricklin et al., 2016). Horses sporadically develop encephalitis
with up to 5% mortality ratio (Hubálek et al., 2014).
Usutu virus (USUV) is another important member of the JEV
serocomplex and was first isolated in 1959 in South Africa. Since
then it has been detected in other countries throughout the African
continent, and in 1996 in Europe (Gaibani and Rossini, 2017).
USUV was directly isolated from mosquitoes, birds and bats, but
serological studies indicate also infection of horses (Ashraf et al.,
2015). Based on a serological survey, USUV was found to circulate
in red deer (0.1–0.2%) in Spain, in some cases with indication of co-
infection with WNV (García-Bocanegra et al., 2016). Recent retro-
spective serological study in southwestern and southeastern
France showed USUV occurrence in 1% of roe deers (Bournez
et al., 2019). It is highly pathogenic to certain birds of prey and
passerines. Clinical signs of disease include apathy, incoordination,
encephalitis, carditis, hepato- and splenomegaly, with high mortal-
ity rates in blackbirds (Hubálek et al., 2014; Ashraf et al., 2015).
Human infection is possible and usually associated with mild clin-
ical signs, although a total of 47 cases of neuroinvasive infections
have been described so far in Europe (Clé et al., 2019).
Orthomyxoviridae
Viruses from the family Orthomyxoviridae are always very
strong candidates for (re)emergence. All orthomyxovirus pan-
demics so far in human history were caused by Alphainfluenzavirus
(1918–1919, 1957–1958, 1968–1969, 1977, and 2009) due to the
emergence of new viruses after various reassortment events
(Wright et al., 2013). Alphainfluenzavirus isolates are divided into
different subtypes based on hemagglutinin (HA) and neu-
raminidase (NA) antigens. Aquatic birds are the natural reservoirs
of Alphainfluenzavirus and 18 HA and 11N subtypes are currently
identified, most of them isolated from wild aquatic birds (water-
fowl and shore birds) (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory
Diseases (NCIRD), 2019). Potentially, 198 different Alphainfluenza-
virus subtype combinations are possible but only 131 have been
identified. Alphainfluenzaviruses are also able to infect various
mammal species including swine, horse, ferret, dog, cat, bat, mar-
ine mammals, and humans. New strains of Alphainfluenzavirus
emerge frequently as a consequence of two main mechanisms:10antigenic drift (mutations resulting from the absence of correction
activity of the RNA dependent viral RNA polymerase) which lead to
variation within a subtype and antigenic shift (genetic reassort-
ment) which generates novel subtypes. Alphainfluenzavirus strains
are commonly species-specific; however, there are many examples
of interspecies transmission. For instance, direct passages of avian
H5 and H7 subtypes have been documented from birds to humans
with most often poultry acting as spillover hosts facilitating the
transmission to human hosts from the wild bird reservoir. In
2009, H1N1pdm09 (2009 influenza outbreak) emerged after multi-
ple reassortment events between avian, swine, and human strains
(Dawood et al., 2009). At multiple occasions, outbreaks initiated in
Southeast Asia probably facilitated by the large human populations
living there and traditional farming practices where ducks,
humans, and pigs living in close proximity.
Regarding (re)emergence, special attention should be made to
pigs, domestic and wild birds and mustelids. Indeed, these animals
are clearly all susceptible to Alphainfluenzavirus with aquatic birds
such as waterfowl and shore birds as the main reservoir of influ-
enza virus subtypes and pigs known as being a mixing vessel
(Ma et al., 2008), since they are at least receptive to infections with
both avian and mammalian influenza viruses. However, for many
years, the molecular basis of this peculiar susceptibility of pigs
remains largely unknown. Recently, an interesting study showed
that the swine host factor ANP32A, unlike swine ANP32B or other
mammalian ANP32A or B, presented stronger supporting activity
to avian viral polymerase offering a molecular basis for the mixing
vessel role of the species (Zhang et al., 2020). This discovery is of
particular importance since pig to human as well as human to
pig transmissions have been identified (Chastagner et al., 2019)
increasing the risk of emergence when humans are also in contact
with domestic birds, especially when pigs and birds have outdoor
access and potential contacts with wildlife.
Paramyxoviridae
Paramyxoviruses have been involved in several (re)emergence
events during the past 30 years (Clayton, 2017). A famous example
is measles virus, which is believed to be a descendant of the cattle-
infecting Rinderpest virus that crossed the species barrier in the
11th or the 12th century (Furuse et al., 2010), occasioning more
infections in the last years compared to before as a result of a lower
vaccination coverage in human populations. Recent emerging infec-
tious disease events have been causedby viruses belonging to twoof
the four subfamilies of the Paramyxoviridae; henipavirus and
rubulavirus.
On a property in Hendra, Australia in 1994, 21 horses presented
a severe respiratory disease leading to the death of 14 of them. Two
weeks later, a trainer and a stable-hand also became ill. The trainer
died a few days later of pneumonia. The causative virus was iso-
lated from a dead horse and named Hendra virus. Since this first
outbreak, several outbreaks were reported in Australia in horses,
sometime in association with human cases. No direct human-to-
human transmission has been reported. Retrospective studies car-
ried out after outbreaks have provided the opportunity to isolate
the virus from fruit bats (Pteropus sp.) (Tulsiani et al., 2011).
Later in 1998, a second henipavirus emerged from fruit bats to
pigs and men. A severe outbreak of encephalitis was observed in
Kampung Sungai Nipah in Malaysia, causing death of one hundred
people. All infected persons had been in contact with sick pigs
(Luby, 2013). The introduction of the Nipah virus on the affected
pig farms did not appear to be a recent event as suggested the
levels of seroprevalence at the index farm (Thibault et al., 2017).
The spillover of the virus from bats (Pteropus sp.) to pigs occurred
many years ago. Since this first emergence, frequent outbreaks of
the Nipah virus disease have been reported in Malaysia, in Bangla-
desh, in India and Philippines. The disease in these different
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eages (Li et al., 2020b). The first lineage was associated with dis-
ease in Malaysia and Singapore. Outbreaks were characterized by
a transmission mainly from pigs, the intermediate and amplifying
host, and a disease with a case-fatality ratio of approximately 40%
(Wang and Anderson, 2019). The second lineage was associated
with disease in Bangladesh, India and Philippines. Most of the
transmission events were human-to-human and directly from bats
via contaminated fruits. The case-fatality rate was higher, about
70–90% (Wang and Anderson, 2019). The genetic diversity of this
lineage was higher than the lineage responsible for the outbreaks
in Malaysia and Singapore, suggesting numerous spillover events
from bats to humans.
The emerging paramyxovirus from the second subfamily of
rubulavirus is less studied than the henipaviruses as human cases
are less serious and less numerous. Menangle virus was identified
in 1997 in Menangle near Sydney in Australia from a piggery with
pigs presenting with flu-like disease and gestation disorders. Two
piggery workers fell ill during the outbreak and developed neutral-
izing antibodies (Chant et al., 1998). Bats of the genus Pteropus
were suspected of being the reservoir as a retrospective study
highlighted neutralizing antibodies in several bat species in Aus-
tralia (Philbey et al., 2008). A similar study, subsequently carried
out in Malaysia in order to find the origin of Nipah virus, isolated
a novel rubulavirus very close to Menangle virus (Chua et al.,
2001). Due to this proximity, an experimental challenge of pigs
was performed to test the pathogenicity of this new virus named
Tioman virus. Pigs were productively infected, suggesting that they
may act as an intermediate host for humans (Yaiw et al., 2008).
This review of emerging paramyxovirus suggests that this only
concerns Asia. However, other potentially emerging paramyx-
oviruses have been identified in other regions of the world. In
2012, a wildlife biologist developed a severe febrile illness attribu-
ted to infection by a rubula-like virus in Uganda (Albariño et al.,
2014). Infection with a paramyxovirus related to Nipah virus was
highlighted by a serological study in people who reported butcher-
ing bats for bushmeat in Cameroon (Pernet et al., 2014). The latter
study suggested that spillover events involving paramyxoviruses
occurred regularly, but that their detection is undertaken only
when clinical events are clearly identified.
The high potential for emergence of paramyxoviruses is
explained by several factors, some of which are shared with other
emerging pathogens and others being more specific (Thibault et al.,
2017). Specifically, spillover events involving paramyxoviruses
seem to be facilitated by evolutionarily conserved host proteins
being used as receptors. Each spillover is accompanied by an accu-
mulation of genetic mutations induced by the selective forces
imposed by the new host. Interestingly, paramyxoviruses adapted
to bats use a mechanism to bypass IFIT1 effector activity that func-
tions at least partially in humans and artiodactyls, an order which
includes pigs and ruminants (Thibault et al., 2017).
Other viruses
Besides the virus families presented above, potential candidates
for future (re)emergence can also be found in other families. For
instance, members of the Poxviridae are able to cross species barri-
ers, the most concerning at this stage being the monkeypox virus
(MPVX) (Bohelay and Duong, 2019). Another example is vaccinia
virus (VACV), able to cross the species barrier from cows (spillover
host) to humans. VACV as well as cowpox virus (CPXV) and MPXV
have been recently responsible for several outbreaks of exanthe-
matic diseases around the world – in humans as well as in bovines,
equids and other animals – and are considered emergent zoonotic
viral diseases (Essbauer et al., 2010; Oliveira et al., 2017). Other
viruses are strongly associated with their host species after a long
co-evolution process (i.e. herpesviruses – (Thiry et al., 2005,112006)). The risk of new disease emerging from these examples
appears far less elevated based on current knowledge. Then, we
cannot exclude new emergences from members of quickly evolv-
ing viral families such as Arteriviridae. Indeed, the porcine repro-
ductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV), for instance, is
evolving particularly rapidly  5.14  10–3 nucleotide substitu-
tions/site/year (Yu et al., 2020) – and is probably originating from
another arterivirus, the mouse lactate dehydrogenase-elevating
virus (Plagemann, 2003). Its successful adaptation to the African
Green monkey kidney cell line MA-104 and its derivatives, such
as MARC145 cells (Xie et al., 2019), should warn the scientific com-
munity about its potential to further cross new species barriers in
the future.
Bacteria
Bacteria are less frequently recognized than viruses as agents of
zoonotic diseases emerging at the interface of wildlife and live-
stock. Nevertheless, the capacity of some already known zoonotic
bacteria that also affect domestic ruminants, to (re)emerge from
unexpected or already identified wild reservoirs is well recognized.
The most spectacular illustration is the re-emergence of bovine
tuberculosis in several European countries. On the other hand,
the emergence of still unknown zoonotic bacteria is considered
as a very unusual event, and there is no significant example involv-
ing wildlife-livestock interface.
Bovine tuberculosis
Evolution of bovine tuberculosis infection in domestic and wild
animals. The situation in England perfectly illustrates the re-
emergence of a wildlife reservoir for a bovine zoonotic agent
(Mycobacterium bovis, very close to M. tuberculosis, the agent of
human tuberculosis). This was completely unexpected, as, by the
early 1970s, the apparent annual incidence of bovine tuberculosis
had declined sharply to 0.05%. When sporadic contaminations of
cattle (infection of cattle or contamination of cattle carcass/meat)
occurred that were difficult to explain, the possible emergence of
a wild reservoir was considered. The responsibility of infected bad-
gers (Meles meles) was unambiguously confirmed, among other
more ‘‘classical” factors. Today, the situation has even worsened.
In 2019, the annual prevalence of infected herds was 9.4% in Eng-
land and 17.9% in the high-risk area of the southwest and centre-
west (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs –
DEFRA, 2020).
In continental Europe, wildlife infection is now described both
in countries with high and low prevalences, like Spain (2.81%
bovine tuberculosis herd prevalence in 2015) (Ciaravino et al.,
2018) and France (France is now bovine tuberculosis-free. To be
classified as officially tuberculosis-free according to the European
Union, a country must fulfil the following criterion: >99.9% of its
cattle herds must be bovine tuberculosis-free for at least six con-
secutive years), respectively. In Spain, the emergence of wild
bovine tuberculosis was first observed in wild boars, in the
Mediterranean Spanish region (herd prevalence reached 17.2% in
Andalusia in 2015), whereas the most affected regions in France
were Côte d’Or and south of New-Aquitaine. This unfavourable sit-
uation still prevails in New-Aquitaine. In both countries, several
wild species are infected (Santos et al., 2020), including wild boars
(Sus scrofa) (Massei et al., 2015), but also red deer (Cervus elaphus)
(Vicente et al., 2006) and/or badgers. Red foxes (Vulpes vulpes) have
recently been incriminated (Michelet et al., 2018). In Spain, non-
cattle domestic species (small ruminants and even pigs) are heav-
ily infected too (Muñoz-Mendoza et al., 2016).
Relationships between tuberculosis infection of wild and domestic
animals. The emergence of cases in wildlife was particularly
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had apparently recently increased. Isolates from infected cattle
and wild animals harboured the same genetic profiles. This con-
firms local transmission of M. bovis from cattle to autochthonous
wild species. Further intra-species transmission has been associ-
ated with the increase of certain wild species populations. For
example, in the UK, badgers became protected in 1970, which
likely allowed badger populations to reach a critical threshold
compatible with the constitution of a new reservoir. In continental
Europe, the difference with the UK is that M. bovis apparently cir-
culates within different multi-host ecosystems, adding further
complexity to the epidemiological situation.
Infection prevalence in wild hosts can even exceed that of
infected cattle, like in Britain and Spain, according to Santos et al.
(2020). This underlines the need to address the dynamics of infec-
tion at a multi-host scale. However, at least in some French regions,
the decrease of bovine infection through vigorous control mea-
sures was followed by a decrease of wildlife incidence, suggesting
that cattle still play a major role in the maintenance of this multi-
host transmission system (ANSES, 2019).
Impact on human infection. A retrospective cohort study of human
M. bovis cases carried out in the UK during 2002–2014 (Davidson
et al., 2017) showed that the incidence remained low. However,
a slight but significant increase was observed (from 0.03 and
0.06 annual cases/100 000), with a decrease of the median age of
autochthonous patients (from 71 years in 2002 to 53 years in
2014). The strongest risk factors among these patients was an agri-
cultural or animal-related occupation and a history of unpasteur-
ized milk consumption for the majority of them. In other
European countries where wildlife infection is observed, the rela-
tionship between wildlife/cattle infection and human M. bovis
infection is not documented to date.
Brucellosis and human infection
Brucellosis is a severe zoonotic disease characterized by acute
septicemia. It can lead to chronic osteoarthritis or orchitis/epi-
didymitis. Two main situations can be distinguished in the context
of wildlife-livestock-human interfaces:
Human infections by Brucella melitensis or Brucella abortus. An inter-
esting example is the occurrence in 2012–13 in France of two
human cases due to B. melitensis biovar 1, including one clinical
case. Both had eaten raw milk cheese from a farm in Haute-
Savoie. The investigations revealed that cows on this farm were
infected with the same strain as the humans. This was quite sur-
prising, as France was brucellosis-free since 2005, and the farm
since 1999. It turned out that these cows had become infected in
summer pastures by an ibex reservoir (Bargy massif), initially con-
taminated by domestic ruminants that had excreted bacteria into
the environment. For the first time, a wild reservoir of B. melitensis
was present in France, which led to human cases via the contami-
nation of cattle (Mailles et al., 2016).
Human infections by Brucella suis. Brucella suis is present world-
wide, with three main biovars affecting swine clinically. Biovars
1 and 3 are far more virulent for humans, while biovar 2 is by far
the most frequent in Europe. Wild reservoirs include primarily
wild boars but also hares (and less frequently roe deer, like in Ger-
many). B. suis 1 has also been isolated from possums, armadillos
and sheep in Argentina and from dogs in the USA and Australia,
and also feral swine in the Americas, whereas B. suis biovar 3 has
also been isolated from horses in Croatia.
If the transmission of B. suis to humans via swine is considered
as anecdotic in Europe, in other parts of the world, swine are more
frequently infected, as biovars 1 and/or 3 involve a multihost trans-12mission system, with both wild and domestic hosts, including
ruminants in several countries, and also feral swine (in the USA,
seroprevalence rates range from 18 to 53%). In these countries,
the processing of swine carcasses is associated with a high risk of
infection of human workers in slaughterhouses (Olsen and
Tatum, 2017). When cattle are involved, raw milk represents a sig-
nificant source of B. suis infection, as cows are generally not show-
ing any clinical signs but can shed high levels of bacteria, even
more frequently than B. abortus, as historically demonstrated
(Jordan et al., 1943).
Q fever and human infection
Q fever is by essence a multi-host zoonotic pathogen, involving
both wild (in particular small mammals) and domestic reservoirs.
The extreme majority of human cases is linked to infected domes-
tic animals. The difficulty relates here to the possibility or not to
incriminate wild animals in the genesis of human cases, as domes-
tic animals also represent a reservoir, which can be considered as
sufficient to maintain the pathogen in a long-lasting manner. How-
ever, in particular when human patients are infected by grazing
animals, which is frequently the case, the role of an initial wildlife
source (via the environment as Coxiella burnetii pseudo-spores are
very resistant, or less frequently via tick bites) is credible, in addi-
tion to other sources.
As a whole, the role of wildlife is obvious, but is not necessarily
required in the context of a given episode of zoonotic transmission
from given domestic livestock. The most spectacular outbreak ever
seen in the world (more than 4 000 reported clinical cases between
2007 and 2011 in the Netherlands with an estimation of at least
ten times more asymptomatic infections) illustrates the capacity
of livestock to be a strong and perennial source of C. burnetii for
humans, as dairy goats and, to a lesser extent, dairy sheep bred
in mega-farms up to 7 500 animals, were identified as the exclu-
sive source for humans. Conversely, recent human cases involved
a particularly virulent strain, MST 17, which emerged in French
Guiana in a very unexpected wild reservoir, the three-toed sloth
(Bradypus tridactylus), which can also be raised as a pet. Interest-
ingly, C. burnetii has not been described yet in domestic ruminants
in French Guiana.
Other considerations regarding bacterial emergence
Several bacterial (re)emergences have been linked to climate
change (Wu et al., 2016; El-Sayed and Kamel, 2020) and vector-
borne zoonoses are already a reality, however, very few of them
involve livestock as an interface with wild reservoirs. In contrast
to viruses, bacteria can survive in complex ecosystems including
soil, wild animals (dead of the disease and/or burrowing animals)
and domestic animals (dead of the disease and/or grazing) from
which they can (re)emerge. For example, certain regions in Russia
were threatened by the emergence of anthrax, as, between 1897
and 1925, frequent outbreaks of anthrax caused the death of 1.5
million deer and affected hundreds of humans in certain areas of
the Russian North, where many historical cattle burial grounds
are present. An outbreak occurred in 2016, after a 75-year break,
with the death of >200 000 reindeers and one child, in addition
to 20 persons hospitalized (Hueffer et al., 2020). This deadly epi-
sode has been associated with the acceleration of permafrost thaw-
ing as spore viability has been estimated at about 105 years in
Siberian permafrost. As about one million wild reindeers and 1.2
million domestic reindeers live nowadays in the Russian North,
both can contribute to increased risks of human anthrax in this
area, by amplifying domestic cases in a first stage.
Thus, the original source of human infection is not always clear
in the case of bacteria, as, for the majority of them, both wild and
domestic animal species can behave as reservoirs (Mycobacterium
bovis, Coxiella burnetii, Brucella suis, Bacillus anthracis and even Bru-
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the amplification of the pathogen. The separation between a wild
reservoir and a domestic reservoir is not always pertinent, as in
some cases, they both contribute to maintain the domestic reser-
voir and to generate a complex ecosystem for the persistence
and the potential increase of the zoonotic risk. A priori, livestock
species seem more appropriate for playing a role as spillover host,
as they live in close proximity with humans. However, with the
adoption of wild animals as pets, the risk of zoonotic infections
remains a reality as seen for Coxiella burnetii recently (see before).
In conclusion, (re)emergence of zoonotic diseases is of major
importance in our attempts to maintain good health for human
populations. To date, (re)emergences have never been anticipated
adequately causing major crises worldwide and reinforcing the
need for a better knowledge of the emergence drivers for the var-
ious microbial candidates in current and future hotspots. Which
virus family will be associated with the next emergence? Where
is it going to occur? Is it going to involve wildlife and/or livestock?
Many families of viruses and some bacterial species are good can-
didates. In the current review we presented potential candidates
for future emerging disease outbreaks. We also explained the main
drivers of emergence and the measures we should collectively put
in place to reduce the risk of an effective emergence in a One
Health context. Then, a risk analysis was discussed to orientate
our future strategies to mitigate the risk of (re)emergence. Improv-
ing our preparation for the next emergences is one of the big chal-
lenges we have to face in the next decades.Ethics approval
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